Corporate Governance and M&A in the Banking Industry by SONG, Li-meng
Canadian Social Science                           Vol.3 No.2 April 2007 
Corporate Governance and M&A in the Banking Industry 
LE GOUVERNEMENT DE CORPORATION ET LE M&A  
DANS L’INDUSTRIE DE LA BANQUE 
Song Limeng1
 
Abstract: Financial economists have long recognized that the widespread separation of ownership 
and control in large corporations creates the potential for costly agency conflicts. This paper 
exploits the banking industry’s recent M&As to explore what corporate governance characteristics 
are associated with managers acting in shareholders’ best interests. Using the sample of publicly 
traded banks at year-end 2000 in different countries and a variety of empirical methods, in contrast 
to existing research on industrial firms, we examine the relation between corporate governance, 
particularly board ownership, and M&A in the banking industry between 2001 and 2003. We find 
that board structure does not help determine which sample banks sell. Neither the fraction of 
outsiders on a bank’s board nor having an outside-dominated board differentiates the target banks 
in our sample. Instead, outside directors/shareholders and blockholders appear to be primarily 
responsible for encouraging bank managers to accept an attractive merger offer. We also find a 
greater frequency of outside blockholders in the banks that become targets, suggesting that large 
non-director shareholders can also encourage banks to act in shareholders’ best interests. 
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Résumé : Les économistes financiers ont longtemps identifié que la séparation répandue de la 
propriété et de la commande à de grandes sociétés crée le potentiel pour des conflits coûteux 
d'agence. Cet article exploite le M&A récent du secteur bancaire pour explorer quelles 
caractéristiques de gouvernement de corporation sont associées aux directeurs pour réaliser les 
meilleurs intérêts des actionnaires. En utilisant l'échantillon de banques publiquement commercées 
à la fin d'année 2000 dans les pays différents et une variété de méthodes empiriques, contrairement 
à la recherche existante sur les sociétés industrielles, nous examinons la relation entre le 
gouvernement de corporation, en particulier la propriété de conseil, et le M&A dans le secteur 
bancaire entre 2001 et 2003. Nous constatons que la structure de conseil n'aide pas à déterminer en 
quelle mode les banques se vendent. Ni la fraction des étrangers sur le conseil d'une banque ni avoir 
un conseil extérieur-dominé ne différencient les banques de cible dans notre échantillon. Au lieu de 
cela, les directeurs/actionnaires et les blockholders extérieurs semblent être principalement 
responsables d'encourager des directeurs d'agence de banque à accepter une offre attrayante de 
fusion. Nous trouvons également une plus grande fréquence des blockholders extérieurs aux 
banques qui deviennent des cibles, proposant que les grands actionnaires de non-directeur puissent 
également encourager des banques à réaliser les meilleurs intérêts des actionnaires. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Financial economists have long recognized that the 
widespread separation of ownership and control in large 
corporations creates the potential for costly agency 
conflicts. Dispersed shareholders’ limited incentive to 
monitor the behavior and performance of the agents 
hired to run their firm can give managers substantial 
freedom to pursue their own interests at the expense of 
shareholder wealth. Absent mechanisms to control 
managerial behavior, usually called “corporate 
governance structures”, wealth maximization will not 
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exclusively motivate corporate decision-making. The 
banking industry’s ongoing consolidation offers an 
excellent experimental setting for examining board 
effectiveness. 
This paper exploits the banking industry’s recent 
M&As to explore what corporate governance 
characteristics are associated with managers acting in 
shareholders’ best interests. Banks provide a useful 
experiment because the burst of recent merger activity 
in this historically fragmented industry allows us to 
study a reasonably large sample of very homogeneous 
firms. Additionally, because the need for regulatory 
approval makes hostile bank takeovers particularly 
difficult, the target bank’s cooperation is generally a 
prerequisite for a bank M&A. Therefore, governance 
structures that amplify an institution’s concern for 
shareholder wealth may play a greater role in 
determining the targets of bank acquisitions than the 
targets of industrial takeovers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The 
first section reviews the relevant existing literature. The 
second presents our sample and data. The third explores  
the differences between the sample banks that do 
and do not become targets. The fourth section 
concludes. 
The potential for agency conflicts inherent in the 
separation of ownership and control makes it important 
that publicly traded corporations have effective 
corporate governance systems. The most immediate 
governance mechanism is the firm’s board of directors. 
The power to hire, fire, and compensate top managers 
gives well-functioning boards the ability to greatly 
reduce any incentive conflicts between managers and 
shareholders.  
To date, most results involving outside directors has 
emphasized the importance of their presence, but not 
their ownership stake in the firm. Byrd and Hickman 
(1992)2 and Cotter et al. (1997)3 explicitly test for the 
impact of outside director ownership on bidder and 
target returns, respectively, during takeover contests. 
However, neither paper finds a significant effect.  
In this paper we examine the relation between 
corporate governance, particularly board ownership, 
and M&A in the banking industry between 2001 and 
2003. The substantial number of mergers in this large, 
historically fragmented industry allows us to compare a 
relatively large sample of banks that become targets 
over a short period of time to all of the remaining 
institutions in the industry. Doing so avoids the need to 
mix takeovers from many disparate industries over a 
                                                        
                                                       
2 Byrd, J., Hickman, K., Do outside directors monitor 
managers? Evidence from tender offer bids, Journal of 
Financial Economics 1992, 32, pp.195–222. 
3  Cotter, J., Shivdasani, A. and Zenner, M., Do 
independent directors enhance target shareholder 
wealth during tender offers?, Journal of Financial 
Economics 1997,43, pp. 195–218. 
long time period in our analysis of corporate 
governance efficacy.  
Because target bank shareholders receive a 
substantial premium in a bank merger while target 
managers risk losing their jobs, manager and 
shareholder incentives tend to diverge on the question 
of whether to sell. Shareholders generally prefer their 
bank become a target while managers prefer their bank 
be one of the survivors. Which banks sell could well 
reveal which corporate governance mechanisms most 
effectively tilt corporate decision-making toward 
shareholder interests. This is not to say that economic 
factors have no influence on which banks buy and 
which banks sell, only that the board’s concern for 
shareholder wealth should have an impact at the margin.  
Our study is closely related to Brook et al. (2000)4 
who compare 321 banks acquired between 1994 and 
1996 to a sample of carefully matched control banks. 
These authors find that banks with substantial inside 
ownership (both director and affiliated blockholder) are 
less likely to be acquired. In particular, these banks are 
less likely to be acquired and see their top management 
fail to remain employed by the buying bank.  
Our study differs from Brook et al. (2000) in two 
important ways. First, our period of study (2001–2003) 
comes during a time when takeover restrictions have 
been dramatically relaxed, making virtually all banks 
potential targets. Second, using the sample of public 
banks in different countries from ZEPHYR (a database 
provided by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing, 
http://www.zephyr.bvdep.com/ip)may give truer 
estimates of the relation between governance and 
whether a bank sells (the regression coefficients) than 
are possible using a matched-sample approach. 
 
2. SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
2.1 Sample 
Our sample comes from ZEPHYR. ZEPHYR is an 
information solution containing M&A, IPO and venture 
capital deals with links to detailed financial company 
information. ZEPHYR now contains information on 
over 350,000 transactions (Jan 2006). Up to 100,000 
new deals are added per year. ZEPHYR has five years of 
global coverage and includes deals involving European 
or American companies going back to 1997. we choice 
a sample of 300 publicly traded banks that entered 2001 
as potential takeover targets at random from 1356 
M&As in the world banking.  
 
4  Brook, Y., Hendershott, R., Lee, D., Corporate 
governance and recent consolidation in the banking 
industry, Journal of Corporate Finance 2000, 6, 
pp.141–164 
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ZEPHYR provides all of the financial data for our 
tests. A bank’s market value of equity is calculated 
using ZEPHYR data as the number of shares 
outstanding times the closing stock price at year-end 
2000. Data on corporate governance structures 
(ownership and board structures) are compiled from 
2000 proxy statements. Because our study focuses on 
corporate governance characteristics, only the 254 
banks with an appropriate proxy available are included 
in our final sample.  
 
2.2  Governance variables 
From the proxy statements, we identify equity 
ownership of all officers and directors as a fraction of 
total shares outstanding. Directors are then classified as 
insiders, outsiders, or gray and the different categories’ 
aggregate fractional ownership are recorded. For our 
purposes, investment bankers are always classified as 
gray directors while other professionals (lawyers, 
accountants, consultants, etc.) are classified as gray 
only if they are reported as having a business 
relationship with the bank. Affiliated block ownership 
is included in our measures of director ownership. 
Undistributed ESOP shares and trust shares (when the 
bank is trustee) are assigned to the bank’s CEO, unless 
the proxy indicates control belongs elsewhere. If an 
individual director controls another entity that is 
reported as owning shares of the bank, the individual 
director is assigned ownership of those shares.  
We define a board as "outside-dominated" if the 
fraction of outside directors exceeds 0.5. We also 
calculate aggregate outside block ownership 
(unaffiliated owners reported as holding more than 5% 
of the bank’s shares) as a fraction of total shares 
outstanding. Our expectation is that greater director 
ownership and having an outside-dominated board will 
improve the board’s ability and incentives to monitor 
and discipline managers. If so, banks with these 
governance characteristics should be more likely, at the 
margin, to accept an attractive merger offer. Similarly, 
we expect that banks with substantial outside block 
ownership will be more apt to become targets.  
 
2.3 Control variables 
Research showing that acquiring firms tend to be larger 
than target firms (Stevens (1973), among others) 
suggests it may be important to control for bank size in 
our tests. We measure size using the bank’s total assets. 
We also control for banks’ average branch size (total 
assets/number of branches). Branch size is intended to 
capture two effects. Banks with many small offices may 
make attractive targets because eliminating redundant 
branches offers greater consolidation benefits. Banks 
with many small branches may also be attractive targets 
because they allow an acquirer to enter a new market 
quickly.  
Tab.1 Sample banks’ summary statistics 
 Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Total assets( $ millions) 7526 1203 3699 
Return on assets 0.011 0.015 0.018 
q-ratio 1.038 1.047 0.524 
Number of branches 54 36 45 
Average branch size 
( $ millions) 
154 138 189 
Percent outside directors on board 0.620 0.540 0.243 
Ownership by all directors and officers 0.089 0.075 0.101 
Ownership by inside directors 0.023 0.017 0.126 
Ownership by outside directors 0.035 0.029 0.138 
Ownership by outside blockholders 0.017 0.011 0.098 
Finally, we control for banks’ past performance. 
Hasbrouck (1985) 5 finds lower q-ratios in 86 
non-financial takeover targets than in either size- or 
industry-matched control firms. Craig and Dos Santos 
(1996)6 show that banks actively acquiring other banks 
typically have performed better than the banks they 
acquire. Controlling for performance is important to 
reduce omitted variable biases. Because board members 
                                                        
5 Hasbrouck, J., The characteristics of takeover targets. 
Journal of Banking and Finance  1985, 9, pp.351–362. 
6 Craig, B., Dos Santos, J., Performance and asset 
management effects of bank acquisitions, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland working paper, 
1996. 
will generally have exceptional information about a 
bank’s future profitability, board ownership may vary 
with performance. When prospects are good (bad), 
board members have an incentive to accumulate more 
(less) stock. Therefore, failing to control for prior 
performance could lead to a spurious correlation 
between director ownership and the likelihood of a 
merger. 
We use two measures of banks’ prior performance, a 
q-ratio and return on assets (ROA). q is the ratio of the 
market value to the replacement cost of a firm’s assets. 
Because banks’ tangible assets are primarily loans and 
liquid financial assets, market values and replacement 
costs are identical in many cases. However, if q is 
interpreted as the ratio of the bank’s value as an ongoing 
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concern to its liquidation value, q = (total assets + 
market value of equity−book value of equity)/(total 
assets + market value of investment securities − book 
value of investment securities).ROA is calculated as the 
ratio of 2000 net income to book value of total assets. 
Tab.1 provides our sample’s summary statistics as of 
year-end 2000. 
 
3. WHICH BANKS SELL? 
 
The optimal time period over which to categorize 
targets is not obvious. One extreme would be to require 
that a bank be acquired in 2001. However, the volume 
of M&A activity in the banking industry (over 45% of 
our sample banks were bought within 2 years) makes it 
unlikely that all willing targets could have sold 
themselves for an attractive price in 2001. If so, a 1 year 
window would miss many banks that should be 
classified as targets because they were about to be 
acquired, because misclassifying targets will reduce our 
tests’ power, we believe it appropriate to categorize 
target banks based on a longer horizon. However, 
extending the window indefinitely does not make sense 
— agreeing to a M&A is supposed to indicate the 
bank’s willingness to sell as of year-end 2000. 
Admittedly, our requirement that targets be acquired in 
a M&A both announced and completed between 
1/1/2001 and 12/31/2003 is somewhat ad-hoc. Later in 
the paper we show that our results are not specific to this 
particular window. ZEPHYR allows us to identify all 
sample banks that were acquired in 2001, 2002 or 2003. 
 
3.1 A univariate comparison 
Tab.2 provides a univariate comparison of the sample 
banks that were acquired and the rest of the sample. 
The only highly significant difference is that target 
banks’ outside directors’ equity ownership is almost 
double that in the other banks: targets’ outside 
directors own an average (median) of 5.3% (4.9%) of 
their bank’s stock while other banks’ outside 
directors own an average (median) of 2.2% (2.1%). 
Targets also have slightly lower median q-ratios and 
slightly higher median unaffiliated block ownership. 
Tab.3 documents the percent of sample banks that 
have (1) an outside-dominated board, (2) at least one 
outside blockholder, or (3) outside director ownership 
that exceeds inside director ownership. Outside 
blockholders are more common in targets than in other 
banks (59% of the targets have an outside blockholder 
versus 38% of the other banks, p=0.04). 
Tab.2 Univariate comparison of target banks to other banks 
 Targets
(75) 
Other 
banks 
(175) 
t- 
statis
tic 
z- 
statis
tic 
Total assets( $ millions) 3865 
(876) 
8564 
(1120)
1.366
3 
0.752 
Return on assets 0.008 
(0.010)
0.010 
(0.013)
0.189 1.235 
q-ratio 1.029 
(1.019)
1.048 
(1.039)
1.238 2.013 
Number of branches 35 
(23) 
68 
(56) 
0.752 0.638 
Average branch size 
( $ millions) 
158 
(49) 
145 
(63) 
0.366 0.083 
Percent outside directors on board 0.632 
(0.452)
0.654 
(0.523)
0.599 0.314 
Ownership by all directors and officers 0.083 
(0.075)
0.092 
(0.082)
1.112 1.536 
Ownership by inside directors 0.025 
(0.019)
0.023 
(0.024)
0.512 0.594 
Ownership by outside directors 0.053 
(0.049)
0.022 
(0.021)
4.112 2.517 
Ownership by outside blockholders 0.014 
(0.015)
0.012 
(0.012)
1.152 1.836 
 
It is also more common for a target bank’s outside 
directors to own more equity than the bank’s inside 
directors (in 68% of the target banks outside directors 
own more than inside directors versus 45% of the other 
banks, p=0.01). There is not, however, a significantly 
greater frequency of outside-dominated boards in target 
banks (78% of the targets have an outside-dominated 
board versus 75% of the other targets, p=0.60).  
 
3.2  A matched sample comparison 
The univariate comparison’s value is limited by the 
possibility that the takeover sample is biased toward a 
particular type of institution, creating a spurious 
correlation between becoming a target and a particular 
corporate governance characteristic. For example, 
directors’ percentage equity ownership tends to vary 
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inversely with size. Therefore, if targets tended to be 
relatively small institutions, size differences could 
account for greater director ownership in target banks. 
Similarly, sample biases could mask important relations 
between other corporate governance structures and 
becoming a target.  
To control for size and geographic differences 
across banks we match each target bank to the 
non-target bank in the same country that is closest in 
size (as measured by total assets). Tab.4 compares 
targets to their  
 
Tab.3 The relative frequencies of corporate governance characteristics 
Frequency in  
Targets Other banks x 2
Outside-dominated board 78% 75% 0.330 
Outside blockholder 59% 38% 5.321 
Outside director ownership> insider director ownership 68% 45% 6.881 
matches. Consistent with the univariate tests, target 
banks have greater outside director ownership than 
control banks — the median difference and the 
statistical significance both increase slightly. 
Additionally, target banks’ median q-ratio is somewhat 
lower than the control banks’. This suggests that the 
targets’ greater outside director ownership cannot be 
explained by director incentives. If anything, targets’ 
relatively poor historical performance suggests 
directors have had an incentive to buy less stock. 
Additional matching criteria produce similar results 
(results not reported in a Table). In two 
performance/region-matched comparisons, using 
banks’ q-ratios and ROA to measure performance, each 
target bank is matched to the non-target bank in the 
same country that has the closest q (ROA). Consistent 
with the size/region match, target banks have 
consistently higher outside director ownership than the 
performance/region-matched sample.  
Two performance/size-matched comparisons 
provide an additional robustness check. Non-target 
banks are divided into four quartiles based on q (ROA) 
and each target bank is matched to the non-target bank 
in the same performance quartile that is closest in size. 
Again, targets’ outside director ownership is 
significantly higher than outside director ownership in 
the control sample.  
 
3.3  A multivariate comparison 
Tab.5 presents a series of logistic regression models in 
which the dependent variable is a dummy indicating 
whether the bank was acquired. Using a logistic 
regression allows us to estimate the marginal impact of 
various corporate governance attributes on the 
likelihood that a bank becomes a target while 
controlling for other bank characteristics. Specifically, 
we control for bank size, prior performance, and the 
bank’s average branch size. In the regressions, bank and 
average branch size are measured as ln(total assets) and 
ln(total Assets/ number of branches), respectively. 
Although we only report regressions controlling for 
prior performance using q, our findings are similar 
using ROA ,except that ROA is not significant in the 
regressions.  
The second logistic regression model shows that 
higher D&O ownership is associated with a bank 
becoming a target (coefficient=2.258, p=0.065). 
However, when we replace total D&O ownership with 
outside director ownership and inside director 
ownership, only outside director ownership receives a 
significant coefficient (the coefficients range from 
5.423 to 7.362 in the various regression models, with 
p-values between 0.005 and 0.0002). Inside director 
ownership receives an insignificant coefficient in all of 
the regression models.  
Based on the third logistic model, the implied 
probability of a bank becoming a takeover target is 
ezi/(1+ezi), where zi=18.312+0.162 ln(Total 
assetsi)−12.37qi−0.962 ln(Average branch sizei)−0.423 
Outside board dummyi+0.632 Outside blockholder 
dummyi+0.723 Inside director ownershipi+9.517 
Outside director ownership.This suggests that a bank 
with median characteristics (as reported in Tab.1 )has a 
0.087 probability of becoming a target. Raising outside 
director ownership to 10% (from the median level of 
2.9%) increases the implied probability to 0.181. 
Outside director ownership being strongly related to 
becoming a target is consistent with substantial equity 
ownership giving outside directors an incentive to 
carefully monitor managers. It is also consistent with 
substantial equity ownership giving outside directors 
the ability to insist that corporate decision-making 
maximize shareholder wealth. These two effects are 
related, because there is little incentive for outside 
directors to monitor managers if they lack the power to 
discipline, but are also distinct. Whether outside 
directors’ financial incentives or “clout” is more 
important has implications for what corporate 
governance characteristics are optimal.  
Regression model (5) in Tab.5 reports the results 
including both the level of outside director equity 
ownership and the clout dummy. Both receive 
coefficients that are significant at the 0.10 level, 
although the clout dummy barely meets this threshold 
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(coefficient=0.789, p=0.097). The coefficient received 
by outside director ownership falls slightly when the 
clout variable is included, and continues to be 
significant at better than the 0.01 level. This is in 
contrast to the clout variable’s coefficient (p-value) 
falling from 2.321 (0.005) to 0.789 (0.097) when the 
outside director ownership variable is included 
(regression with clout dummy alone not reported). We 
interpret this as evidence that outside directors’ direct 
financial stake in the firm plays the dominant role.  
It is somewhat surprising that higher inside director 
ownership is not associated with a bank becoming a 
target. Although it is unlikely manager and shareholder 
interests can be perfectly aligned, because insider 
ownership makes managers shareholders, it should have 
some impact on managerial incentives. To see whether 
the lack of a relation between insider ownership and a 
bank’s willingness to sell is sensitive to how insider 
ownership is measured, we repeat the logistic regression 
models using a variety of alternative metrics. However, 
insider ownership’s unimportance is unchanged if we 
replace inside director ownership with (1) top officer 
ownership (D&O ownership minus outside and grey 
director ownership), (2) top officer ownership plus grey 
director ownership (D&O ownership minus outside 
director ownership), or (3) CEO ownership (regressions 
not reported but available upon request).  
It is possible that managerial ownership’s 
importance is not captured by our linear regression 
specification. Morck et al. (1988) 7  propose that 
managerial ownership has two effects. Because it makes 
managers bear part of the costs (and reap part of the 
benefits) of their decisions, ownership gives managers 
an incentive to maximize value. However, greater 
ownership also gives managers more direct control over 
the firm, increasing their ability to resist external 
discipline. This entrenchment could allow managers to 
take value-destroying actions without risking 
replacement. The net impact of these two effects is 
unclear. Both Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990)8 provide empirical evidence suggesting 
that the marginal effect of increased managerial 
ownership depends on the current level. Similarly, 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997)9 show that how investors 
react to inside board member appointments depend on 
the level of insider ownership.  
 
                                                        
7  Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., Management 
ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis, 
Journal of Financial Economics ,1988, 20, pp.293–316. 
8 McConnell, J., Servaes, H., Additional evidence on 
equity ownership and corporate value, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 1990,27, pp.595–612. 
9 Rosenstein, S., Wyatt, J., Outside directors, board 
independence, and shareholder wealth, Journal 
of Financial Economics, 1990,26, pp.175–192. 
4.   CONCLUSION 
 
Using a variety of empirical methods, we document a 
strong and consistent link between outside director 
equity ownership and banks becoming takeover targets. 
Because agreeing to a merger systematically benefits 
target shareholders, outside director ownership appears 
to focus decision-making on shareholder wealth 
maximization. We also find a greater frequency of 
outside blockholders in the banks that become targets, 
suggesting that large non-director shareholders can also 
encourage banks to act in shareholders’ best interests.  
Our results provide an interesting contrast to the 
existing literature. Although outside ownership is 
associated with banks being acquired, neither insider 
ownership nor outside-dominated boards are 
consistently associated with banks becoming targets. 
Although past research has had limited success 
predicting successful takeovers using ownership 
variables, the bulk of the evidence suggests that 
substantial insider ownership impedes takeovers. In our 
sample, inside ownership inhibits takeovers only when 
insider director ownership exceeds outside director 
ownership.  
Past research using industrial firms tends to find that 
having an outside-dominated board improves corporate 
decision-making, but little evidence that greater outside 
director ownership is associated with shareholder 
wealth maximization. We find the reverse in our sample 
of bank mergers. This divergence of results suggests 
that outside ownership and presence of outside directors 
may play discrete roles — outside ownership helps put 
the firm “in play” while outside directors make sure 
shareholders receive the largest premium possible once 
merger negotiations begin. Future studies will need to 
explore these potentially different roles more carefully. 
 21
Song Limeng /Canadian Social Science Vol.3 No.2 2007 16-22 
Tab.4 Matched sample univariate comparison of target banks to other banks 
 Targets Matched sample t-statistic z-statistic 
Return on assets 0.008 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.010) 0.854 0.652 
q-ratio 1.029 
(1.019) 
1.048 
(1.039) 
1.438 1.658 
Number of branches 35 
(23) 
68 
(56) 
0.912 0.713 
Average branch size( $ millions) 158 
(49) 
145 
(63) 
0.254 1.438 
Percent outside directors on board 0.632 
(0.452) 
0.61 
(0.55) 
0.356 0.188 
Ownership by all directors and officers 0.083 
(0.075) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
0.912 1.538 
Ownership by inside directors 0.025 
(0.019) 
0.032 
(0.025) 
0.225 0.00 
Ownership by outside directors 0.053 
(0.049) 
0.031 
(0.017) 
3.132 2.872 
Ownership by outside blockholders 0.014 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
0.212 0.724 
 
Tab.5 Logistic regressions explaining which banks become targets within 3 years 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 
4 
Model 5 
Ln(total assets) 0.054 
(0.458) 
0.162 
(0.152) 
0.412 
(0.113) 
_ 0.362 
(0.119) 
q-ratio -11.23 
(0.117) 
-14.02 
(0.192) 
-12.37 
(0.215) 
_ -14.213 
(0.097) 
Ln(average branch size) -0.557 
(0.095) 
-0.852 
(0.015) 
-0.962 
(0.025) 
_ -0.924 
(0.135) 
outside board dummy _ 0.372 
(0.919) 
-0.423 
(0.117) 
-0.123 
(0.747) 
-0.854 
(0.055) 
Blockholder dummy _ 0.772 
(0.049) 
0.632 
(0.065) 
0.787 
(0.045) 
0.923 
(0.047) 
Ownership by all directors and officers _ 2.258 
(0.065) 
_ _ _ 
Ownership by inside directors _ _ 0.723 
(0.717) 
-2.230 
(0.425) 
0.823 
(0.817) 
Ownership by outside directors _ _ 9.517 
(0.005) 
9.557 
(0.000) 
9.552 
(0.005) 
Outside director ownership> insider director 
ownership 
_ _ _ _ 0.789 
(0.097) 
Pseudo-R2 5.4% 6.8% 12.1% 5.8% 11.7% 
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